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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
CHESTER

G. VERNIER

AND ELm~ER A. WILCOX.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey on the Sterilization Law.
-The following copy of the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, with
respect to the validity of the sterilization law in that state has been received
through the courtesy of Mr. Nelson B. Gaskill, assistant attorney general of
New Jersey. It is published here in full. [Ed.]
Alice Smith, Prosecutrix, v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded (including Idiots, Imbeciles and Morons), Epileptics, Criminals and Other Defectives, defendant.
Submitted July 3, 1913. Decided November i8, 5913.
1. The artificial regulation of the welfare of society by means of surgical
operations for the prevention of procreation being based upon the suppression
of the personal liberty of, individuals must be accomplished, if at all, by a statute that does not deny to the persons thus injuriously affected the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution
of the United States.
2. The Board of Examiners created by "An act to authorize and provide
for the sterilization of feeble-minded (including idiots, imbeciles and morons),
epileptics, rapists, certain criminals and other defectives" (P. L. 1911, p. 353),
ordered that the operation of salpingectomy be performed upon one Alice Smith,
an epileptic inmate of a state charitable institution, as the most effective operation for the prevention of procreation.
Held: That the statute in question was based upon a classification that
bore no reasonable relation to the object of such police regulation, and hence
denied to the individuals of the class so selected the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United
States.
On Certiori.
The order brought up by this writ of certiorariis as follows:
"The Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded (including idiots, imbeciles, and morons), epileptics, criminals and other defectives, together with David F. Weeks, the chief physician of the New Jersey
State Village for Epileptics, having on the thirty-first day of May,
1912, regularly convened at the Administration Building at the New
Jersey State Village for Epileptics (according to the provision of Chapter 190, page 353, of the Laws of 1911, Statutes of the State of New
Jersey), and at that time, in the presence of Azariah M. Beekman, counsel
regularly appointed to represent Alice Smith, an inmate of said village, committed thereto on August 19, 1902, by Alfred F. Skinner, judge of the
Court of Common Pleas of Essex County, application for the appointment
of said counsel having been made to, and the appointment having been
made, previous to the holding of said hearing, by the judge of the Court
of Common Pleas of the County of Somerset, in which county the institution in which the said Alice Smith is an inmate is located, having examined
into the mental and physical condition of the said Alice Smith, do find and
declare her to be an epileptic person within the meaning of said act; and
the said board, together with the chief physician of said institution, having
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unanimously found in the case of said Alice Smith, that procreation by her
is inadvisable, and that there is no probability that the condition of said
Alice Smith, so examined, will improve to such an extent as to render
procreation by said Alice Smith advisable."
"It is, therefore, on this the thirty-first day of May, nineteen hundred
and twelve, ordered, that the operation of salpingectomy, as the most effective operation for the prevention of procreation, be performed upon the
said Alice Smith in accordance with the motion at said hearing unanimously
adopted."
The pertinent parts of the statute under which this order was made are as
follows:
"An act to authorize and provide for the sterilization of feeble-minded
(including idiots, imbeciles and morons), epileptics, rapists, certain
criminals and other defectives. (P. L. 1911, p. 353.)
"WHan As, Heredity plays a most important part in the transmission of
feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, criminal tendencies and other defects;
"BE IT ENAcTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of
New Jersey:
"I. Immediately after the passage of this act, the governor shall appoint by and with the advice of the senate, a surgeon and a neurologist,
each of recognized ability, one for a term of three (3) years and one for
a term of five (5) years, their successors each to be appointed for the full
term of five years,'-who in conjunction with the Commissioner of Charities
and Corrections, shall be known as and is hereby created the 'Board of
Examiners of Feeble-Minded (including idiots, imbeciles and morons),
Epileptics, Criminals and other Defectives,' whose duty it shall be to examine'into the mental and physical condition of the feeble-minded, epileptic,
certain criminal and other defective inmates confined in the several reformatories, charitable and penal institutions in the counties and state.
"2. The criminals who shall come within the operation of this law
shall be those who have been convicted of the crime of rape, or of such
succession of offenses against the criminal law as in the opinion of this
board of examiners shall be deemed to be sufficient evidence of confirmed
criminal tendencies.
"3. Upon application of the superintendent or other administrative officer of any institution in which such inmates are or may be confined, or
upon "its own motions, the said board of examiners may call a meeting to
take evidence and examine into the mental and physical condition of such
inmates confined as aforesaid, and if said board of examiners, in conjunction with the chief physician of the institution, unanimously find that procreation is inadvisable, and that there is no probability that the condition of
such inmate so examined shall improve to such anl extent as to render procreation by such inmate advisable, it shall be lawful to perform such operation for the prevention of procreation as shall be decided by said board of
examiners to be most effective, and thereupon it shall and may be lawful
the direction
for any surgeon qualified under the laws of this state, under
of the chief physician of said institution, to perform such operation."
*Before Justices GAiuusoN, TRENcHARD and MINTURN.
For the prosecutrix, Azariah M. Beekman.
For the defendant, Nelson-B. Gaskill, Assistant Attorney General.
(Elmer T. Elver, Esq., of the Wisconsin Bar, on the brief.)
The opinion of the court was delivered by GAmRISON, J.
The question propounded is whether or not the statute under which the
order now before us was made is a valid exercise of the police power. The
statute, it will be observed, applies also to criminals, in which aspect it does
not now. concern us since the prosecutrix is an epileptic, an unfortunate person but not a criminal.
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The order is made by the Board of Examiners provided by the act of 1911
(P. L., p. 353). Briefly stated, the order after reciting that Alice Smith is an
epileptic inmate of a state charitable institution, that procreation by her is inadvisable, and that there is no probability that her condition will improve to such
an extent as to render procreation by her advisable, orders that the operation of
salpingectomy be performed upon the said Alice Smith.
Salpingectomy is the incision or excision of the fallopian tube, i. e., either
cutting it off or cutting it out. The fallopian tube is an essential part of the
female reproductive system and consists of a narrow conduit some four inches
in length that extends on each side of a woman's body from the base of the
womb to the ovary upon that side. These three organs, i. e., the ovary, the fallopian tube and the uterus, are all concerned in normal child-bearing, the relation between them being that the unfecundated ovum which is periodically produced in the ovary passes down through the fallopian tube into the body of the
uterus where, if fecundation by the male seed takes place, or has taken place,
the embryo is formed and developed into the fcetus or unborn child.
The statute is broad enough to authorize an operation for the removal of
any one of these three organs essential to procreation. These organs are in
pairs on either side of the body excepting the uterus, which is a single organ
lying deep in the pelvis, back of the bladder. The operation of salpingectomy,
therefore, to be effective must be performed on both sides of the body, and
hence is in effect two operations, both requiring deep-seated surgery under profound and prolonged anasthesia, and hence involving all of the dangers to life
incident thereto, whether arising from the ana.sthetic, from surgical shock or
from the inflammation or infection incident to surgical interference with the
peritoneal cavity. These ordinary incidents and dangers of such an operation
are not lessened where the operation is not sought by the patient, but must be
performed upon her by force at least to the extent of the production of such
anaesthesia as shall completely destroy all liberty of will or action. The order
is addressed to no one and is silent as to the person by whom this operation is
to be performed, and the statute likewise is silent upon this subject, excepting
that when an order is made, "thereupon it shall be and may be lawful for any
surgeon qualified under the laws of this state, under the direction of the chief
physician of said institution, to perform such operation."
The prosecutrix falls within the classification of the statute in that she is
an inmate of the State Villagei for Epileptics, a state charitable institution, "the
objects of which," as stated in the act creating it, are "to secure the humane,
curative, scientific and economical care and treatment of epilepsy." (4 Comp.
Stat., p. 4961.)
The prosecutrix has been an inmate of this charity since 1902, and for the
five years last passed she has had no attack of the disease. From this statement of the facts it is clear that the order with which we have to deal threatens
possibly the life and certainly the liberty of the prosecutrix in a manner forbidden by both the state and federal constitutions, unless such order is a valid
exercise of the police power. The question thus presented is, therefore, not one
of those constitutional questions that are primarily addressed to the legislature,
but a purely legal question as to the due exercise of the police power which is
always a matter for determination by the courts.
This power, stated as broadly as the argument in support of the order re-
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quires, is the exercise by the legislature of a state of its inherent sovereignty to
enact and enforce whatever regulations are in its judgment demanded for the
welfare of society at large in order to secure or to guard its order, safety, health
or morals. The general limitation of such power, to which the prosecutrix
must appeal is that under our system of government the artificial enhancement
of the public welfare by the forceable suppression of the constitutional rights
of the individual is inadmissible.
Somewhere between these two fundamental propositions the exercise of the
police power in the present case must fall and its assignment to the former
rather than to the latter involves consequences of the greatest magnitude. For
while the case in hand raises the very important and novel question whether it
is one of the attributes of government to essay the theoretical improvement of
society by destroying the function of procreation in certain of its members who
are not malefactors against its laws, it is evident that the decision of that question carries with it certain logical consequences having far-reaching results.
For the feeble-minded and epileptics are not the only persons in the community
whose elimination as undesirable citizens would, or might in the judgment of
the legislature, be a distinct benefit to society. If the enforced sterility of this
class be a legitimate exercise of governmental power, a wide field of legislative
activity and duty is thrown open to which it would be difficult to assign a
legal limit.
If in the present case we decide that such a power exists in the case of
epileptics, the doctrine we shall have enunciated cannot stop there. For epilepsy
is not the only disease by which the welfare of society at large is injuriously
affected; indeed, not being communicable by contagion or otherwise, it lacks
some of the gravest dangers that attend upon such diseases as pulmonary consumption or communicable syphilis. So that it would seem to be a logical necessity that, if the legislature may, under the police power, theoretically benefit
the next generation by the sterilization of the epileptics of this, it both may and
should pursue the. like course with respect to the other diseases mentioned with
the additional gain to society thereby arising from the protection of the present
generation from contagion oe contamination. Even when these and many other
diseases that might be named have been included, the limits of logical necessity
have by no means been reached.
There are other things besides physical or mental diseases that may render persons undesirable citizens or might do so in the opinion of a majority of
a prevailing legislature. Racial differences, for instance, might afford a basis
fol such an opinion in communities where that question is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue. Even beyond all such considerations it might be
logically consistent to bring the philosophic theory of Malthus to bear upon the
police power to the end that the tendency of population to outgrow its means of
subsistence should be counteracted by surgical interference of the sort we are
now considering.
, Evidently the large and underlying question is how far is government constitutionally justified in the theoretical betterment of society by means of the
surgical sterilization of certain of its unoffending but undesirable members. If
some, but by no means all, of these illustrations are fanciful, they still serve
their purpose of indicating why we place the decision of the present case upon
a ground that has no such logical results or untoward consequences.
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Such a ground is presented by the classification upon which the- present
statute is based, which is of such a nature that the persons included within it
are not afforded the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "no state
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Under this provision it has been uniformly held that a state statute that bears
solely upon a class of persons selected by it must not only bear alike uponall
the individuals of such class, but that the class as a whole must bear some
reasonable relation to the legislation thus solely affecting the individuals that
compose it.
"It is apparent," said Mr. Justice Brewer in Gulf, Colorado, &c., R. R. Co.
v. Ellis (165 U. S., p. 150), after a review of many cases, "that the mere fact of
classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in all cases it must appear, not
only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some
reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to
the attempted classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection."
This summarizes a mass of cases that might be cited.
Turning our attention now to the classification on which the present statute
is based and laying aside criminals and persons confined in penal institutions
with which we have no present concern, it will be seen that-as to epileptics,
with which alone we have to do-the force of the statut6 falls wholly upon such
epileptics as are "inmates confined in the several charitable institutions in the
counties and state." It must be apparent that the class thus selected is singularly narrow when the broad purpose of the statute and the avowed object
sought to be accomplished by i are considered. The objection. however, is not
that the class is small as compared with the magnitude of the purpose in view,
which is nothing less than the artificial improvement of society at large, but that
it is singularly inept for the accomplishment of that purpose in this respect,
viz., that if such object requires the sterilization of the class so selected, then
fortiori does it require the sterilization of, the vastly greater class who are not
protected from procreation by their confinement in state or county institutions.
The broad class to which the legislative remedy is normally applicable is that
of epileptics, i. e., all epileptics. Now, epilepsy, if not, as some authorities contend, mainly a disease of the well-to-do and over-fed, is at least one that affects
all ranks of society, the rich as well as the poor. If it be conceded for the sake
of argument that the legislature may select one of these broadly defined classes,
i.e., the poor, and may legislate solely with reference to this class, it is evident
that by the further sub-classification of the poor into those who are and those
who are not inmates in public charitable institutions, a principle of selection is
adopted that bears no reasonable relation to the proposed scheme for the artificial betterment of society. For not only will society at large be just as injuriously affected by the procreation of epileptics who are not confined in such
institutions as it will be by the procreation of those who are so confined; but the
former vastly outnumber the latter and are in the nature of things vastly more
exposed to the temptation and opportunity of procreation, which indeed in the
cases of those confined in a presumably well-conducted public institution is reduced practically to nil.
The particular vice, therefore, of the present classification is not so much
737
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that it creates a sub-classification based upon no reasonable basis, as that having thereby arbitrarily created two classes, it applies the statutory remedy to
that one of those classes to which it has the least, and in no event a sole, application, and to which indeed, upon the presumption of the proper management
of our public institutions, it has no application at all. When we consider that
such statutork scheme necessarily involves a suppression of personal liberty and
a possible menace to the life of the individual who must submit to it, it is not
asking too much that an artificial regulation of society that involves these constitutional rights of some of its members shall be accomplished, if at all, by a
statute that does not deny to the persons injuriously affected the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the federal constitution.
The suggestion that the classification might be sufficient if the schme of
the statute were to turn the sterilized inmates of such public institutions loose
upon the community and thereby to effect a saving of expense to the public is not
deserving of serious consideration. The palpable inhumanity and immorality of
such a scheme forbids us to impute it to an enlightened legislature that evidently enacted the present statute for a worthy social end upon he merits of
which our present decision upon strictly legal lines is in no sense to be regarded
as a reflection.
The conclusion we have reached is that without regard to the power of the
state to submit its citizens to surgical operations that shall render procreation
by them impossible, the present statute is invalid in that it denies to the prosecutrix of this writ the equal protection of the laws to which under the constitution of the United States she is entitled.
The order brought up by this writ is set aside.
The Meaning of the White Slave Act as Shown by Federal Decision.It being stated in associate press dispatches that, lately, it has been held in a
district court in Kansas, that the Mann or White Slave Act does not reach, for
constitutional reasons, and presumptively was not intended to reach, mere personal immorality in one taking a female from one state to another for the
gratification of his own lust, or to live with him in concubinage, it becomes
useful to refer to Supreme Court decisions, construing this act, rendered February 4, 1913. Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281; Athanasaw v.
U. S., 227 U. S. 326, 33 Sup. Ct. 285; Bennett v. U. S., 227 U. S. 333, 33 Sup.
Ct. 288; Harrisv. U. S., 227 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 289.In our former comment in 76 C. L. J. 261, we spoke of these cases marking
another step in national power, in which the intent of the defendant, rather
than the quality of his act, showed the exercise of a national police power in
behalf of the morality of our country as a whole. As the view above alluded
to appears to us to fail to admit such interpretations of those decisions, we shall
endeavor to show that it was upon this conception that they proceeded.
All of these cases, except the Athanasaw case, appear to relate to keepers
of houses of ill-fame importing girls for the plying of the trade of prostitutes
therein, but this circumstance is in no wise stressed in the elaborate opinion by
Justice McKenna, rendered in the Hoke case. The Athanasaw case, however,
was very different. The inducement and transportation was for an apparently
legitimate purpose--for the female's employment as a chorus girl at a stated
salary in the state to which she was being transported.
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Of course, it is to be conceded, that, if this was but the ostensible purpose
with the real intent to lead the female into a life of debauchery or prostitution,
all of the cases would be upon the same footing, but the burden would be upon
the prosecution to show this. It is, therefore, necessary to look further and
see if this requirement was met.
The evidence showed that upon arrival at her destination the female appeared at the theatre and took part in rehearsals, having never before had any
stage experience. One of the defendants, on the same day, made improper
proposals to her, saying he wanted her for his girl and not to let any of the
boys fool her. She was thrown into association with boys who were smoking,
cursing and drinking. She became frightened, and, getting word to a policeman, was taken out of the place.
The court stated that the charge was that she was transported with the intent to induce her or entice her to enter upon a course of debauchery, and
that such intent was "to corrupt in morals or principles, to lead astray morally
into dishonest and vicious practices; to lead into unchastity."
The defendants contended that defendants must have had a deliberate intent to debauch her when she came there; that either one or the other intended
to debauch her or to get somebody else to debauch her.
The Supreme Court approved the instructions, and denied this contention,
saying: "The plan and place justified the instructions. The plan might have
succeeded if the coarse precipitancy of one of the defendants and the ribaldry
of the habitues of the place had not shocked the modesty of the girl. And the
employment to which she was enticed was an efficient school of debauchery of
the special immorality which defendants contend the statute was designed to
cover."
It is perceived that it appears to have been conceded that, if defendants or
either of them intended to debauch the girl, there would have been a case under
the act, and the court ruled that the act was more comprehensive than thisembracing this and more than this.
But concede that all of this is arguendo in the opinion, then we refer to
the Hoke case, where the constitutionality and purpose of the statute is more
fully considered and we see that in answering the objection to constitutionality
that it is "a subterfuge and attempt to interfere with the police power of the
states to regulate the morals of their citizens, and assert that it is in consequence an invasion of the reserved powers of the states. There is unquestionably a control in the states over the morals of their citizens, and, it may be
admitted, it extends to making prostitution a crime. It is a control, however,
which can be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the states, but there is a
domain which the states cannot reach and over which congress alone has
power; and, if such power be exerted to control what the states cannot, it is
an argument for-not against-its legality. Its exertion does not encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the states."
We pause to say, that, if this does not mean that congress can control what
the state cannot and in the same way the state could, if its jurisdiction there
extended, this is about as misleading argumentation as it was within the power
of the learned justice to pursue.
He does not, however, stop with this or qualify in any way its apparent assertion of a national police power, but on the contrary, seems to state it more
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emphatically in saying: "Our dual form of government has its perplexities,
state and nation having different spheres of jurisdiction as we have said;
but it miust be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to
the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised,
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral."
Have we still a doubt of the court's belief of national police power being
identical within national zone with state power in its zone? If so, then interpret what the learned justice says in' his summary of' his own reasoning. "The
principle established by the cases is the simple one, when rid of confusing and
distracting considerations, that congress has power over transportation 'among
the several states'; that the power is complete in itself and that Congress, as
an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary, but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations."
It is unfortunate, indeed, that such an opinion should have been written,
if it yet may be successfully argued, that one may transport a woman from one
state to another for any immoral purpose pertaining to sexual relations. Indeed, it seems to us to be less clearly within national power that probable or
ultimate interstate traffic in prostitution is attempted to be prevented, that the
intent by one still in the federal zone may be penalized. Consequences wholly
within state jurisdiction are its exclusive concern. But whether this view be
sound or unsound, what do these decisions -mean ?-From Central Law Journal,
Oct. 10, 1913.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Morse v. Brown, 206 Fed. 232. Meaning of "reputed." Acts Conn.
1907, c. 122, provides for sentence by fine or imprisonment on any
person who shall be convicted of keeping a house which is, or is reputed to
be, a house of ill fame, or which is resorted to or is reputed to be resorted to,
for purposes of prostitution and lewdness. Held, that since the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors prior to the adoption of such statutes had held that
the word reputed as so used in other statutes, would be construed as limited
to reputation founded on facts, and not on mere irresponsible rumor, the statute
so construed, was not unconstitutional, as violating the federal constitution, as
justifying a conviction of an offense on irresponsible rumor.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

Johnson v. State, Ala. 63 So. 163. Convict sentenced to imprisonment for
life. The Alabama statute provides that "any convict sentenced to imprisonment for life, who commits murder in the first degree while such conviction
remains in force against him must, on conviction, suffer death." The defendant
had been convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hanged.
The governor commuted the sentence to- life imprisonment. While the defendant was serving, this commuted sentence he killed a fellow convict. It was
objected that the case did not fall under the above statute, as he had not been
sentenced to imprisonment for life, but had been sentenced to be hanged. Held,
that the effect of the commutation was to make him a life convict under judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree and that he was properly
convicted under the statute.
Robertson v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 159 S. W. 713. Enactment of inconsistent proz4iotts in code. The Texas code of 1895 made certain, forms of
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gambling a misdemeanor, punishable by fine. In 1907 a county attorney. was
killed by a gambler for trying to enforce the gaming laws. The legislature,
which was then in session, made the same acts felonies, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Both sets of these statutes were incorporated in
the code of 1911. Defendant was convicted and sentenced under the section
making the offense a -felony. He appeals upon the ground that the two sets
of provisions are in conflict, and hence nullify each other. Held, that the act
of 1907, covering the same ground as the sections in the code of 1895, repealed
them by implication. The commissioners who prepared the code of 1911 were
instructed to omit repealed acts. Their failure to omit the repealed sections of
the code of 1895 was due to oversight. The history of the various enactments
shows that the legislature did not intend to re-enact the ,repealed articles by
incorporating them in the code. "Where a statute upon a special subject has
been repealed, not expressly but by implication by the enactment of a later statute on the same subject inconsistent with the first, and both laws are subsequently included in a revision or codification, they still have the same relative
force and effect as before the codification; that is to say, the earlier remains
repealed by the later statute." Hence the defendant was properly convicted
under the act of 1907.
CONTEMPT.

,

United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700. Misbehavior so near the court
as to obstruct administration of justice. In the provision of Rev. Stat.,
Sec. 725, and Judicial Code, Sec. 268, limiting the power of federal
courts to punish for contempt to "misbehavior in the presence of the
court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," the second clause is not restricted in meaning to acts committed so near
in point of distance to the place of holding court as to be obstructive to orderly
procedure, which are covered by the preceding clause as construed by the Supreme Court, but applies to all acts of misbehavior whose natural tendency and
effect are to interfere with the administration of justice, wherever the acts may
be committed.
ElRoNEous JUDGMENT.

Ex parte Robinson, Ala., 63 So. 177. Sentence to Wrong Prison. 'The
Alabama statute authorizes the jury to fix the length of a term of imprisonment. It also provides that when the term is one year or less it shall be served
in the county jail. The petitioner was convicted of manslaughter and the jury
fixed his punishment at one year in the penitentiary. The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first
ordered a new trial, but on reconsideration set aside this order and remanded
the case for re-sentence in accordance with the statute. Petitioner then brought
the case by certiorarito the Supreme Court. Held, that the portion of the verdict fixing the place of punishment might be disregarded as surplusage, so there
was no error until the judgment was rendered. Hence the verdict should not
be set aside but the judgment alone should be reversed and the case remanded
for a lawful judgment. The action of the Court.of Appeals was approved. A
prior decision of the Supreme Court, which held the other way on this point,
was expressly overruled, and concurrent expressions in two later cases were
disapproved.
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ERROR WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Vick v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 159 S. W. 50. Improper cross-examination.
Defendant, while on trial for murder, took the stand in his own behalf. While
he was a boy, thirteen years before this trial, he had been convicted of horse
stealing, but had been pardoned. Out of hearing of the jury, the defendant's
attorney stated' these facts to the judge and county attorney, and asked the
court to instruct the county attorney not to ask questions seeking to bring out
this fact on cross-examination. The court said he had no power to give such
instructions, and refused to do so. On cross-examination the county attorney
asked defendant if he had not been so convicted. The defendant objected.
The court made no ruling. Before the question was answered the county attorney had the minute book showing the prior conviction brought into court.
The judge examined the book and then susta'ined defendant's objection to the
question, and instructed the jury not to consider what had just occurred.
Held, the evidence was inadmissible, as the prior conviction occurred while defendant was a boy, about eighteen years old; there was no showing that he had
not reformed, and especially as he had been pardoned. But it was error for the
court to refuse to instruct the county attorney not to examine as to the prior
conviction. The court had the power and it was his duty to do so, and he
should have used the whole power of the court to enforce his instructions. If
the county attorney had "asked or attempted to ask such questions the court
should have inflicted such immediate and esvere punishment that would not
only deter him but any other prosecuting officer in the future to desist." But
as the court at last sustained the objection to the question and specifically instructed the jury not to consider what had occurred and in allowing the bill of
exceptions stated that in hearing the testimony of the jurors on a motion for
new trial it was shown that this matter had no effect on them, the error was
without prejudice sufficient to require a reversal. The conviction was affirmed.
Anderson v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 159 S.W. 847. Admission of incompetent evidence. On trial of defendant for burning a barn, the state was permitted to prove that there was a large quantity of grain, hay and millet, and also
eleven head of horses, all burned in the barn. The defendant objected to the
evidence as being "irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial, and calculated to arouse
the passions' of the jury and prejudice them against the defendant." Defendant
was convicted and the jury assessed the minimum .punishment. Held, that if
the evidence was improperly admitted, the verdict shows that no passion or
prejudice was aroused against him, hence the error was without prejudice. But
the court thought the evidence was properly admitted, as it was shown that the
defendant knew the contents of the building. The conviction was affirmed.
Seymour v. State, Fla., 63 So. 7. Rulings at the trial. Appeal on account
of error in giving or refusing charges, in rulings on the admissibility of testimony, and other matters of procedure. Held, as the errors, if any, did not affect any fundamental rights of the defendants, and it appears from the whole
record that they were not prejudicial, "the evidence of guilt being ample and
positive," the judgment should be affirmed.
EVIDENCE.

People v. Burger, Ill. 102 N. E. 751. Admissibility of evidence of other
offenses. Harmless error. On *a trial for larceny of goods in a department
store, the testimony of a police officer as to a conversation with accused imme742
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diately after her arrest, disclosing that the officer charged her with having been

arrested and convicted in another city, and with having previously stolen other
goods from the department store, followed 'by a display in the presence of the

jury of accused's picture, taken in the other city was improper.
But where the undisputed proof of guilt of accused is so strong that it
would not have been possible for the jury to have returned any other verdict
than that of guilty, the error in admitting improper testimony was harmless.
FORMER JEOPARDY.

United States v. Gonzales, 206 Fed. 239. Conviction of lower offense. Under the rule of the federal courts, a defendant indicted for murder in the first
degree, but convicted of an included crime, by procuring such conviction to be
set aside by the trial court or an appellate court, waives the right to use the
judgment by plea of former jeopardy, and may be again tried for murder in
the first degree.
IMPEACHMENT.

People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, warden, 143 N. Y. Supp. 325. When power
may be exercised. The constitution empowers the assembly to impeach the governor, but it does not specify when the power shall be exercised, and the assembly is the sole judge of the time as well as the grounds of impeachment, free
from control by the executive or the courts.
Hence the impeachment of the governor by the assembly while in extraordinary session is valid, though const. art. 4, sec. 4, provides that no subject
shall be acted on at such a session except such as the governor recommends, and
it had not been recommended, as the power of imp'eachment is a judicial and
not a legislative power and one that should always be independent of outside
control.
INDIMCTENT.

Zoborowsky v. State, Ind. 102 N. E. 825. Allegation of age it rape.
Burns' Ann. Stat., 1908, Sec. 2250, provides that whoever unlawfully has
carnal knowledge of a female child under 16 years of age is guilty of rape,
Held, that an indictment charging that accused did unlawfully touch the person of N- with the unlawful and feloneous intent to ravish her, she being then
.a child under the age of 12 years, to wit, 10 years of age, was not objectionable,
as using the words "twelve years," instead of "sixteen years," the statutory
age of consent; since the statute merely fixes a definite time below which the
crime is committed, without reference to the consent of the female, and an
allegation that the age of the victim is below the statutory limit of consent is
sufficient.
People v. Waldhorn, 143 N. Y. Supp. 484. Allegation of attempt to eommit
arson. Pen. Code, par. 2, defines an "attempt to commit a crime" to consist of an
act done with intent to commit the crime, and tending, but failing, to effect its
commission. Sec. 221 declares that a person who wilfully burns or sets on
fire in the night-time a building wherein to the knowledge of the offender
there is at the timei a human being is guilty of arson in the first degree. Code
Crim. Proc., Sec. 275, provides that an indictment shall contain a plain and concise statement of the act constituting the crime. Held, that an indictment for
attempt to commit arson in the first degree, charging that accused on a specified date did feloneously, etc., set fire to and burn the structure described,
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wherein'to his knowledge there was a human being, and by such manner and
means did attempt to commit arson in the first degree, was fatally defective for
failure to allege the act or acts showing the manner in which defendant attempted to fire the building.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

Coulter v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 159 S. W. 557. Alternative pleading.
Defendant was convicted of perjury on an indictment which charged that at
one hearing he "did then and there, knowingly and falsely state and swear
that Sie did not hear Milton Brown tell R. G. Railly at Railly's office or anywhere else on the face of the earth to burn or destroy said deed," and that at
a later hearing he "did wilfully, knowingly and falsely state and swear that
he did hear Milton Brown tell R. G. Railly at Railly's office, to burn or destroy
said deed. One or the other of said statements so made by said Coulter is and
was false and untrue and was known to be false and untrue by said Coulter at
the time he made same. But which one of said statements was false and untrue
is to this grand jury unknown, but was known to said Coulter to be false and
untrue when he made same, when in fact and in truth said Coulter did or did
not hear Milton Brown tell said Railly to burn or destroy said deed, but whether
he did or did not hear said Brown so state is to this grafid jury unknown, but
is and was known to said Coulter when he made same." A statute required indictments to be direct and certain as regards the offense charged and to set out
the particular circumstances thereof. Held, that as there was no provision in
the code authorizing alternative pleading, the indictment was fatally defective,
as it did not negative by special averment the matter alleged to have been falsely
stated. Instead of pointing out the testimony that was false the indictment
expressly states that the grand jury did not know which was true. The conviction was reversed.
JURY.

State v. Turner, La., 63 So. 169. Exclusion of negroes. Defendant, who
was a negro, was convicted of shooting another negro with a dengerous weapon.
Ie appeals upon the ground that the names of no negroes were put into the
venire box. There were about 1,600 white men and 200 negroes qualified to
serve on juries. Three hundred names were put into the box. There was some
testimony that the jury commissioners had for years discriminated in favor of
white jurors. The commissioners who selected the names from which this
jury, was drawn testified that they had not selected any negroes and did not
think it necessary to select negroes, as long as they had "good, solid, competent
white men to fill this position." Held, that the jury commissioners are to
select jurors according to their real qualifications. They are to select some,
and exclude others not because they are white or black, but because they are
competent or incompetent, and each commissioner is to determine as to the
qualifications of the juror whom he concurs in selecting, upon his individual
responsibility, and according to his conscience and best judgment. If the commissioner is a white man, in that part of the country his associates are white
men, and his acquaintance among negroes may be extremely limited. It would
be inexcusable if he should pass over white men whom he knew to be competent, good and true, to select jurors from among negroes or .other white men
of whose qualifications he was ignorant or whom he knew to be incompetent.
Hence in the intelligent, legal and proper exercise of a plain duty, white com-
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missioners will be apt to select white jurors rather than colored. As the record
indicates that he received as fair and impartial a trial before an all-white jury
as he would have had before an all-colored or a mixed jury, there was no error
in the selection of the jurors.
PARDON.

People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, Warden, 143 N. Y. Supp. 325. Granted by
an impeached governor. Under Const. art. 4, sec. 6, providing that "in case of
the 'impeachment' of the governor * * * the powers and duties of the office
shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor * * * until the disability shall
cease," after "impeachment," which is a method of procedure in a criminal case
against a high official, the reins of government are transferred to the lieutenant
governor, and a pardon granted by the governor, while under impeachment, is
void.
PRESUMPTIONS.
Miller v. State, Miss., 63 So. 269. That a person is not a physician or
dentist. The defendant Was convicted of making an unlawful sale of cocaine
to a negro boy. He appeals on the ground that the state did not prove that the
sale was not made to a legally licensed physician or dentist, or upon a physician's prescription. Held, that if the sale was made upon a prescription, the
fact is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and consequently he
should prove it. It is presumed "that what is common in general, prevails in
particular," and "a fact, the existence of which is once shown continues." As
the right to practice medicine and dentistry is granted only to exceptional persons, and not to the mass of the people, and as the negro boy was not a licensed
physician or dentist at birth, there is a double, prima facie presumption that he
was not a licensed physician or dentist at the time of the sale. This presumption is sufficient to support the state's case. The conviction was affirmed.
SENTENCE.

Kenny, v. State, Md. 8, At. 1109. For a second -offense. Where accused is indicted for the sale of liquor on Sunday, after having been
previously convicted of the same offense, and the verdict is simply guilty,
he cannot be sentenced to the additional penalty provided for the second offense, since the verdict does not show that the jury found him guilty of a
second offense.
Stevens v. M'Claughry, warden, 207 Fed. 18. Where different offenses are
part of the same act. The sentence of a defendant, convicted under
separate counts of an indictment under Section 5469, Revised Statutes,
of larceny of a mail pouch containing registered letters and of letters, and also of larceny 'of registered letters and of embezzlement
of their contents, committed at the same time and place, and as
parts of a continuous criminal act to separate punishments, is beyond
the jurisdiction of the court and void as to the excess above the maximum
punishment that may be imposed for a single offense; and, after the defendant
has satisfied such a sentence, he is entitled to his relief by habeas carpus.
Separate offenses which are committed at the same time and arel parts of a
continuous criminal act, inspired by the same criminal intent which is an essential element of each offense, are susceptible of but one punishment.

